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ABSTRACT
We assess size and scope-related economies in the global advertising and marketing services
business. A translog cost function is employed wherein a firm's costs vary according to its scale and
two dimensions of the scope of its operations. Parameters of the model are estimated via three stage
least squares using annual data for 1989-2001 for an unbalanced panel consisting of the eight largest
firms in this industry.
A firm's total variable costs are affected by its scale, scope (mix of services and markets served), and
by the interaction of the two dimensions of scope. The latter effect suggests that economies of
coordination may accompany the strategy of jointly offering advertising and marketing services
globally. Estimates indicate that the industry's long-run cost function is subject to very slight
economies of scale. Diseconomies of scale accompany growth in volume obtained by extending
either breadth of service offerings or market coverage. A small cost advantage, typically of one to
two percent, is uniformly associated with joint production of services for the domestic and overseas
markets, as compared to splitting up the firm into smaller stand-alone entities. Scope economies of
a similar magnitude arise consistently from the joint production of advertising and marketing
services.
Alvin J. Silk
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SCALE AND SCOPE ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL 
ADVERTISING AND MARKETING SERVICES BUSINESS 
 
Alvin J. Silk and Ernst R. Berndt 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The large body of theoretical and empirical studies on the economics of advertising has 
tended to focus almost exclusively on issues relating to the amounts firms expend for advertising 
and the effects those outlays have on consumers and competition. For an extensive review, see 
Bagwell (2002). However, analysis of the “production” side of advertising has been largely 
neglected by economists. Over the past two decades the organization of the advertising and 
marketing services business has undergone a major structural change.  In response to shifts in 
client demand, advertising agencies in search of growth have globalized and diversified their 
services. Concurrently, after long maintaining a diverse and unconcentrated size structure, the 
advertising agency and marketing services business has become more consolidated, with 
publicly-owned holding companies now dominating this industry.  
 Despite these developments, there has been surprisingly little empirical study of the 
economics of firms engaged in the production of global advertising and marketing services. The 
purpose of this paper is to address that void. How important are scale and scope economies in the 
global advertising and marketing services business? Much of the rationale underlying the growth 
strategies of these organizations emphasizes size-related advantages (Elliot 2002). At the same 
time, whether global firms possess a sustainable competitive advantage over smaller, regional 
players is the subject of an ongoing debate within the industry (Anholt 2000). Several waves of 
mergers and acquisitions have fueled concerns about the rising concentration level in the 
industry (Kim 1995). The holding company model employed by global firms has also recently   4
come under renewed scrutiny (Cardona 2002b, Khermouch 2003). For all these reasons then, the 
issue of size-related economies in this industry is one deserving empirical analysis. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first econometric study of such cost economies 
We treat holding companies as multiproduct firms and estimate a translog model of firm 
costs applying three-stage least squares to a time series of annual data for an unbalanced panel 
consisting of the eight leading global advertising and marketing services firms. Collectively this 
group of holding companies accounted for more than ninety percent of the estimated total 
revenue earned in 2001by the hundred largest firms in this industry.  
Our results can be briefly summarized. We demonstrate that a firm’s costs are affected by 
its size, scope (mix of services offered and markets served) and the interaction of the latter two 
dimensions of firm scope. The presence of the interaction effect supports a major but 
controversial element of holding company strategy; namely, that coordination economies are 
available from the delivery of integrated advertising and marketing services globally. Using the 
parameter estimates for the translog cost function, we then investigate the extent to which overall 
scale economies/diseconomies and product-specific scale and scope economies/diseconomies are 
available to firms in this industry. Our estimates indicate that the industry’s long-run cost 
function is subject to very slight economies of scale. Growth obtained by extending either the 
breadth of services offered or market coverage is accompanied by diseconomies of scale, a result 
we show not to be inconsistent with the existence of overall or global economies of scale. These 
findings do not point to any substantial level of potential scale economies that remains to be 
exploited by the largest firms in this industry. Such findings are to be expected in a highly 
competitive industry with relatively low fixed costs.   5
Small scope economies involving cost savings of one to two percent are realized through 
diversification of either lines of business or market coverage. The institutional constraint arising 
from the longstanding industry norm that prohibits an agency from serving competing accounts 
that Silk and Berndt (1995) hypothesized to limit the growth and diversification potential of 
traditional full service advertising agencies appears to have been obviated by the holding 
company form of organization. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the global advertising and 
marketing services business and the holding company form of organization used by firms in this 
industry. Section III sets forth the econometric model and method employed here along with 
measures of scale and scope economies. In Section IV, the database is described and estimation 
results are presented. Section V summarizes our findings on scale and scope economies. Section 
VI discusses implications of the results and possible limitations and extensions of the present 
study. Section VII presents our conclusions. 
II.  THE GLOBAL ADVERTISING AND MARKETING SERVICES BUSINESS 
II.1.  Globalization of Advertising and Marketing Services  
The beginning of the internationalization of the advertising and marketing services 
industry dates back at least as far as 1899 when J. Walter Thompson opened an office in London 
(West 1987). In 1927 Thompson became General Motors’ “export agency” and embarked on a 
rapid international expansion. In the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, Thompson opened thirty-four 
branch offices in Europe, the Middle East, South Africa, India, Australia, and South America 
(Merron 1999). Thompson was not GM’s domestic agency and its appointment on the export 
account lasted only five years. Interestingly, Merron (1999, p. 469) observed:  “the key to the 
branch offices’ survival was that they aggressively pursued local clients.” Weinstein (1974)   6
traced the international expansion of fifteen U.S. agencies over the period 1915-1971 and found 
that the rate at which agencies opened offices in countries for the first time almost quadrupled 
over the period 1960-1971. 
Comparatively little appears to have been written about the international expansion of 
Asian or European agencies. A notable exception is West’s (1988) insightful study of 
multinational competition in the British advertising agency business over the period 1936-1987.  
West’s analysis identified two distinct phases of development. The first, beginning in the 
interwar period and lasting until the late 1970’s, is characterized- as the “Americanization of 
British advertising.”  The share of total advertising billings in the U.K. held by U.S. 
multinational agencies grew from thirteen percent in 1936, peaking at forty-two percent in 1970. 
Unlike the U.S., the agency business in Britain has long been a highly concentrated industry. The 
billings share of the ten largest agencies was seventy percent in 1936 and reached eighty-two 
percent in 1970.  The pioneering U.S. agencies in the U.K. were greenfield entrants following the 
multinational growth path of their U.S-based clients.  Reciprocal alliances between American 
and British agencies became commonplace in the interwar period. Later in the post-World War II 
period, West shows that acquisitions became important, noting that between 1957 and 1967, U.S. 
agencies purchased thirty-two British agencies. 
The second phase of West’s historical analysis covers the comeback of the British. The 
share of U.K. billings held by U.S. multinational agencies fell from a high of forty-two percent in 
1970, to 34 per cent in 1980 and 22 per cent in 1987. The major developments in this period 
were the aggressive growth and stunning success, at home and abroad, of two London-based 
firms: first, Saatchi & Saatchi (beginning in the late 1970’s); and then WPP, in the late 1980’s. 
West (1988) contrasts the advantage exploited by the British in their domestic comeback and   7
international expansion with that of the earlier American penetration of the high end of the U.K. 
market: 
The advantage accruing to British advertising agencies in the changing trends in foreign 
direct investment flows in the 1980’s was different from that previously held by the 
Americans.It provided access to capital, rather than to the patronage of large advertisers. 
Throughout the entire period, British agencies have never been able to exploit the 
indigenous British-based MNE advertiser in the same way that U.S. agencies have used 
American MNEs (p. 487).   
West argues that Saatchi & Saatchi’s domestic success inspired confidence within the 
British financial community, giving advertising agencies improved access to capital and 
permitting them to grow by means of acquisitions: “The new ease in raising capital facilitated the 
spectacular entrance of British multinational advertising agencies into the American domestic 
market from 1982 onward” (p. 499).  That advance was marked by two highly publicized deals:  
Saatchi & Saatchi’s acquisition of New York-based Ted Bates Worldwide in May 1986, and 
WPP’s takeover of J. Walter Thompson in June 1987. 
In the next section, we consider the dominant organization form that the industry has 
adopted in pursuit of growth and globalization, namely, the public holding company. 
II.2.  The Holding Company Concept 
 The world’s largest advertising and marketing services firms are all public holding 
companies that own (partially or outright) numerous operating companies offering a wide variety 
of related and/or competing services to clients. To varying degrees, the parent organization 
performs a coordinating role and supplies subsidiary organizations with support programs, 
systems, and resources. However, as the chief financial officer of a leading firm in this industry 
was recently quoted as saying: “There is no single model for a successful holding company. 
Their success depends on how they perform their functions, whether as a hands-off financial 
entity or a structure to help networks work together” (Cardona 2002b).   8
The pioneering global advertising and marketing services holding company is the 
Interpublic Group of Companies.  Marion Harper, who served as its Chairman and CEO 
throughout the 1960’s, is widely acknowledged to have been the architect of this organizational 
innovation. Harper saw adherence to the industry’s longstanding norm that an agency not serve 
competitors in the same category of business as a major impediment to achieving the twin goals 
of growth and diversification (American Association of Advertising Agencies 1979).  He 
proposed the holding company concept as a means of circumventing that stricture. His 
biographer and colleague reported Harper as having said: “I don’t see why it shouldn’t be 
possible for us to own more than one agency and serve competing accounts, as long as we keep 
the two agencies completely separate” Johnson (1982, p. 96). Despite initial resistance from 
clients and criticism from competitors, Harper eventually prevailed and the holding company 
concept gained acceptance and spread. 
Silk and Berndt (1995) analyzed the industry norm on conflict policy as an institutional 
mobility barrier (in the sense of Caves and Porter (1977)) that induces individual agencies to 
grow by diversifying their lines of service offerings rather than by expanding existing ones. A 
second institutional factor identified by Silk and Berndt (1995) as affecting agency growth and 
diversification strategies of advertising agencies was the industry practice of agencies bundling 
creative and media services, a strategy encouraged by the fact that it is customary for clients to 
advertise simultaneously in several media. Based on these two considerations, Silk and Berndt 
(1995, p. 439) advanced the hypothesis of  “excessive” diversification: “the joint presence of 
media bundling on the demand side and conflict policy on the supply side constitute institutional 
constraints that induce firms to diversify more extensively than might otherwise be cost 
justified.” Consistent with this hypothesis, in a cross-sectional analysis of 1987 data for 401 U.S.   9
advertising agencies, Silk and Berndt (1995) found that media-specific scope economies were 
negatively related to agency size. 
Silk and Berndt’s (1995) analysis and empirical study were conducted at the level of 
individual advertising agencies, rather than that of holding companies. Two important structural 
changes have occurred since 1987, the year of the data Silk and Berndt utilized. First, over the 
past two decades there has been a growing tendency for advertising agencies to unbundle their 
services as multi-product clients have sought to gain bargaining power with media suppliers by 
consolidating media buying for their brands in organizations specializing in media planning and 
buying (Horsky 2002). Secondly, all of the major holding companies have established media 
planning and buying units that are available to perform these functions for clients of the 
networks of agencies controlled by the holding companies (Mandese 2002). Thus, it may be 
these changes have allowed holding companies to obviate the disadvantage of excessive 
diversification Silk and Berndt (1995) argued as being present at the level of individual agencies 
in 1987. 
Holding company management face an ongoing challenge to achieve a balance between 
policies that favor centralization in ways that may improve coordination and profitability, versus 
those that allow decentralization in order to foster creativity and maintain credibility with clients 
as to the independence of individual organizations. For example, Omnicom has the reputation for 
granting considerable autonomy to its operating divisions (Elliot 2002). WPP is one of the 
organizations studied by Raynor and Bower (2001) in their research on how strategic integration 
is accomplished in contemporary diversified companies facing dynamic and uncertain 
environments. They observe that WPP has been successful in building a strategically flexible   10
organization by pursuing different degrees of relatedness among the operating divisions, some 
being closely linked, others less so. See Bower and Hunt (2001) for details. 
Based on Advertising Age’s estimates of holding companies worldwide gross incomes, 
the annual nominal growth rate of the world’s ten largest holding companies averaged almost 
thirteen per cent over the twelve year period, 1990-2001. This growth is almost three times 
greater than the growth rate of worldwide expenditures for advertising and marketing services 
that averaged only four and a half percent over the same time period.
1 
Scale and scope economies figure prominently in the reports of investment analysts who 
follow this industry closely, especially with respect to how cost economies relate to the basic 
elements of firm strategy (growth, globalization, diversification) and industry consolidation. 
Among the major industry trends emphasized by Doft et al. (2002) are client demand for 
integrated marketing services and cross national consistency in brand communications, as well as 
interest in consolidating the multiplicity of accounts with fewer service suppliers. Fine et al. 
(2003) point out that the growth rate and margins of marketing services tend to be greater than 
those for advertising-related services. However, they see size-related improvements in margins 
as being difficult to realize, in part because of client cost-consciousness and bargaining power. 
Diversification with respect to both lines of service offered and markets served may also affect 
the sensitivity of holding companies’ performance to the business cycle. However, Fine et al. 
(2003) note that diversification can serve not only to dampen downturns, but may also limit 
speed of recoveries. 
Against this background, we move on to a discussion of the modeling framework and 
analytical methods used in our empirical study. 
                                                 
1 This growth rate calculation was based on WPP’s estimates of the size of the worldwide marketing 
communications expenditures presented each year in their annual report.   11
III. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND METHOD 
We begin this section with the specification of the cost function employed in the 
empirical analysis. Definitions of the measures of scale and scope economies reported later are 
then presented along with expressions for estimating them in terms of the variables and 
parameters of the translog cost function. Detailed derivations are given in Appendix A. 
III.1. Model  Specification 
We employ a translog (transcendental logarithmic) model to represent a firm’s total 
variable costs of producing its output of services. Widely used in empirical econometrics, the 
translog model is a “flexible” functional form that can be used to capture a variety of size-related 
cost phenomena arising from the operations of multiproduct firms, including in particular, scale 
and scope effects (Berndt 1991, Paul 1999). The translog cost function for firm i (i=1,…,k) may 
be written as follows: 
 ln  TVCi = ln  αi + β1  ln Yi + ½  β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia + θ MidPia (1) 
where: 
 TVCi  =  total variable cost 
 Y i  =  a measure of the scale of total output 
 M id  =  share of firm’s output (Y) produced for the U.S. market, rather than for the 
overseas’ markets, (1-Mid),  Mid  ≤ 1 
 P ia  =  share of firm’s total output consisting of advertising services, rather than of 
other marketing services, (1-Pa),  Pai  ≤ l 
where αi ,β1, β2 ,γ, δ, and θ are parameters to be estimated.              12
Now the firm’s average variable cost (AVCi) is given by: 
 ln  AVCi = ln  (TVCi / Yi ) = ln TVCi – ln Yi 
   =  ln  αi + (β1- l) ln Yi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia + θ Mid Pia (2) 
This specification of the translog cost model allows for the possibility of both scale and 
scope effects. Depending on the signs and magnitudes of the scale parameters, β1 and β2, the 
AVC function may be either everywhere decreasing or U-shaped in Y. 
The two potentially important sources of scope effects discussed in Section II are 
represented in the translog cost function. The first arises from how a firm’s total output is 
distributed across the regional markets it serves. We attempt to capture this effect by treating the 
global market as a dichotomy, consisting of a domestic (U.S.) segment and a composite 
“overseas” market. These account for Mid and (1- Mid) of the firm’s total output, respectively. 
The other dimension of scope relates to the composition of the firm’s output with respect 
to its lines of business or products/services. We treat a firm’s output as consisting of either 
“advertising” or “other marketing” services, representing Pia and (1- Pia), respectively, of its total 
output. Note that the definitions treat these two dimensions of the firm’s scope as completely 
separate from one another. 
The final term of (2) is the cross-product of the shares of firm output accounted for by the 
domestic (U.S.) market (Mid) and advertising services (Pia), respectively. This interaction term 
allows for the two dimensions of scope to affect costs jointly as well as separately. A negative 
sign on the coefficient for this interaction term would be consistent with the view that firms may 
realize a cost-reducing benefit through their pursuit of a key feature of their business strategies, 
that of providing global clients with “one stop shopping” for a broad array of advertising and 
marketing services (Lawrence 2000). Economies of coordination may be achieved through   13
exploiting synergies in delivering a variety of services to a geographically dispersed client base 
that are not available when operations are more specialized and localized. Alternatively, firms 
may incur additional coordination costs in providing global clients with an array of services that 
are absent in more specialized and localized operations. Even when economies of coordination 
are available, they may be bargained away in negotiating compensation and service levels with 
clients (Fine et al., 2003). Such conditions would suggest that “one stop shopping” could raise 
costs and lead to a positively-signed coefficient for the interaction term. Thus, a priori, it is not 
clear whether the expected sign for the coefficient of the cross-product of the share terms for the 
two dimensions of scope should be positive or negative. 
We now turn to defining explicit measures of scale and scope effects. 
III.2. Scale  Economies 
In traditional economic theory, the firm produces a single product, and in such cases 
returns to scale are measured by the inverse of the elasticity of total cost with respect to output:  
the percentage change in total cost associated with a one percent increase in output (cf. Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld 1995). The returns-to-scale measure is also equal to the ratio of average cost to 
marginal cost. 
In the case of a multiproduct or multi-service firm, the notion of average cost is not well-
defined since the mix of outputs may change with overall size. To circumvent this problem, 
returns to scale are defined in terms of the effects on total cost when all the service outputs are 
increased proportionately, i.e., holding the mix of service outputs constant. This concept is 
referred to as global or ray returns to scale (Bailey and Friedlander 1982) and in the present 
context is defined as: 
 RRSi = (TVCi /Yi) / (∂TVCi /∂Yi), evaluated at Mid = M
*
id,  Pia = P
*
ia (3)   14
For our translog cost model (1), it is readily shown that: 
  ∂ln TVCi /∂ln Yi = (∂TVCi /∂Yi) ( Yi / TVCi)   
   =  β1 + β2 ln Yi (4) 
Re-arranging terms, we obtain: 
 RRSi = 1/  (β1 + β2 ln Yi)  (5)    
When there are economies of scale, total cost (TVC) increases less than proportionately 
with output (Y), marginal cost (∂TVC/∂Y) is less than average cost (TVC/Y), both of which 
are declining in Y, and RRS is greater than one. When there are diseconomies of scale, marginal 
cost exceeds average cost, and RRS is less than one. 
Another measure of scale economies that is particularly useful for the multiproduct or 
multi-service firms is that of product-specific scale economies (Bailey and Friedlander 1982). In 
the present context, one may view a firm as producing two types of outputs: advertising-related 
services (denoted by the subscript a) and other marketing services (m). We assume that the mix 
of domestic (U.S.) and overseas volume is the same for both types of services and equal to the 
share, Mid, and (1-Mid), respectively so that the composition of the firm’s total volume in terms 
of markets served is unchanged. 
SCL(MS)i, is then defined as the ratio of average incremental cost, AICim, to the marginal 
cost, MCim of producing other marketing services (m), in addition to advertising (a): 
 SCL(MS)i = AICim / MCim, (6) 
where average incremental cost (AICim) is defined as the incremental cost of adding other 
marketing services to firm previously producing only advertising-related services,   15
 AICim = [TVC(Yi) – TVC(Yia)]/Yim, (7) 
 with  Yi  = Yia + Yim,  
and where TVC(Yi) is the total variable cost of producing both advertising and other marketing 
services as defined above by (1).  TVC(Yia) is the total variable cost of producing only 
advertising-related services (with Yia = Pia Yi ) and Yim= (1- Pia )Yi is output of other marketing 
services. MCim is marginal cost is defined as ∂TVC(Yi) /∂Yim. 
For the multiproduct cost function (1), SCL(MS)i turns out to be (see Appendix A for 
details of the derivation): 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 γ Mid + δ Pia + θ Mid Pia} 
     -  exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (Pia Yi)  + ½ β2 (ln Pia Yi )
2  + (γ + θ)Mid + δ}] 
 SCL(MS)i = ______________________________________________________  (8) 
     [ { β1 + β2 ln Yi}exp{ln αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mdi                                                     
+ δ Pi + θ Mdi Pia}]                                               
The above analysis may be viewed as assessing the scale economies associated with 
adding “other marketing services” to the firm’s existing offering of advertising-related services. 
Such an analysis is meaningful in that it reflects the growth path of our sample of firms.  
Historically, these firms were initially full service advertising agencies and over time expanded 
their operations to include other marketing services. 
In our scale economy calculations we assume that the mix of U.S. and overseas volume is 
the same for both types of services and equal to that for the firm’s total output, as given by Mid. 
Note that for a dichotomous scope variable, the sign of its coefficient in the cost model (1) and 
the expression above (8) for product-specific scale economies are both sensitive to the manner in 
which the dichotomous scope variable is defined, i.e., Pia vs. (1-Pia) and Mid vs. (1-Mid).   16
It is also of interest to assess the scale economies associated with becoming “global” by 
adding the volume sold in the overseas market ([1-Mid]Yi) to that for the domestic (U.S.) market 
(Mid Yi). For these calculations, we assume that the mix of advertising and marketing services is 
the same for both the domestic (U.S.) and overseas markets and equal to the share of the firm’s 
total output of advertising and marketing services, as given by Pia, and (1-Pia), respectively. 
We define a product-specific index of scale economies, SCL(OV)i associated with 
extending operations from the domestic (U.S.) market (d) to the overseas market (denoted by the 
subscript o). SCL(OV)i is the ratio of average incremental cost, AICio, to the marginal cost, MCio 
of producing the volume sold in the overseas market (o) in addition to that being sold in the 
domestic market (d): 
 SCL(OV)i = AICio / MCio, (9) 
where average incremental cost (AICio) is defined as the incremental cost associated with 
producing for the overseas market incurred by a firm previously producing only for the domestic 
(U.S.) market: 
 AICio = [TVC(Yi) – TVC(Yid)]/Yio, (10) 
 with  Yi = Yid + Yio,  
where TVC(Yi) is the total variable cost of producing the volumes sold in both the domestic 
(U.S.) and overseas markets as defined by (1) above. In this context, TVC(Yid) is the total 
variable cost of producing only the volume sold in domestic (U.S.) market  (Yid = Mid Yi ) and 
Yio= (1- Mid)Yi is the output sold overseas.  MCio is marginal cost and is defined as∂TVC(Yi) / 
∂Yio. 
For the multiproduct cost function (1), SCLio may be shown to be (see Appendix A for 
details of the derivation):   17
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia + θ Mid Pia} 
     -  exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (Mid Yi)  + ½ β2 (ln Mid Yi )
2  + (δ + θ)Pia + γ}]    
 SCL(OV)i =   ______________________________________________________  (11) 
     [ { β1 + β2 ln Yi }exp{ln αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid                                                 
+ δ Pia + θ Mid Pia }] 
Note that SCL(MS)i and SCL(OV)i may differ because in general, TVC(Yia) ≠ TVC(Yid). 
The manner in which both AICio and MCio are defined above assumes that a firm expands 
operations from its “home base” in the U.S. to serve the “overseas” market. As will become 
apparent in section IV.2 below, this assumption is consistent with the operational definition of 
the scope variable for “markets served” as the share of output arising from U.S. operations used 
later in the estimation of the cost model (Equation (1)). Analysis of product-specific scale 
economies associated with expansion from a home base in the U.S. to the overseas market 
conforms to the history of four of our sample of eight firms identified in Section IV.1 that 
follows (Grey, Interpublic, Omnicom, and WPP). However, the historical growth paths of the 
other four firms were different. In the cases of the other four firms in our sample (Cordiant, 
Dentsu, Havas, and Publicis), their operations were initially in overseas markets and later 
expanded to the U.S.  Hence for the latter firms, SCL(OV)i  as defined in (9) and (11), does not 
have an historically meaningful and comparative interpretation. For this reason, we report 
estimates of SCL(OV)i  only for the former four firms (Grey, Interpublic, Omnicom, and WPP). 
III.3. Scope  Economies 
Scope economies arise when cost savings are realized from producing multiple services 
and/or from serving multiple markets rather than splitting up the firm into separate smaller 
entities, each producing just one service and/or serving a single market.  See Bailey and   18
Friedlander 1982 for a detailed discussion of the distinction between scale and scope economies 
in a multiproduct firm, as well as references to the literature. 
To measure the degree to which there are scope economies in the case at hand, we 
estimate the percentage of the total variable cost of production that is saved when the 
advertising-related and other marketing services are produced jointly by the same firm rather 
than produced by two stand-alone firms. As in the case of scale economies discussed in III.2, we 
consider two alternative ways of splitting production: according to either:  (a) service mix, 
advertising-related versus other marketing services; or (b) market served, U.S. versus overseas. 
Consider first cost savings that arise from joint rather than stand-alone production of 
different lines of business, i.e., components of the service mix. For that split, returns to scope 
(RSPLBi) or the percentage cost savings realized from joint versus individual production is: 
 RSP(LB)i = [TVC(Yia) + TVC(Yim) – TVC(Yi)]/  TVC(Yi) (12) 
When economies of scope are present, the joint cost, TVC(Yi),  is less than the sum of the 
individual costs, TVC(Yia) + TVC(Yim),   and RSP(LBi) is greater than zero. If the joint cost 
exceeds the sum of the stand-alone costs, RSP(LBi) is negative and there are diseconomies of 
scope. 
For the multiproduct cost function (1), it can be shown that (see Appendix A for details): 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 ln Pai Yi + ½ β2 (ln Pia Yi )
2 + (γ + θ) Mid + δ ]                                               
     +  [exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (1- Pia )Yi + ½ β2 (ln (1-Pia )Yi )
2 + γ Mid ] 
 RSP(LB)i  =  ________________________________________________        - l  (13) 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia  + θ Mid Pia}]                                               
For the alternative stand-alone split based on market served, returns to scope, RSP(GL)i, 
the percentage cost savings gained from joint versus stand-alone production is:   19
 RSP(GL)i = [TVC(Yid) + TVC(Yio) – TVC(Yi)]/  TVC(Yi)] (14) 
where [TVC(Yid + TVC(Yio)] is the sum of the costs of producing the volumes sold in the 
domestic (U.S.)  and overseas markets (Yid, and Yio, respectively), and TVC(Yi) is the total cost 
of producing these outputs jointly. As is shown in Appendix A, for the multiproduct cost 
function (1), RSP(GL)i turns out to be: 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 ln Mid Yi + ½ β2 (ln Mid Yi )
2 + γ + (δ + θ) Pia]                                               
                 + [exp{ln αi + β1 ln (1- Mid )Yi + ½ β2 (ln (1-Mid )Yi )
2 + δ Pia ] 
 RSP(GL)i  =  ________________________________________________          - l  (15) 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia + θ Mid Pia}] 
Note that RSP(MS)i and RSP(GL)i may differ because in general, [TVC(Yid) + 
TVC(Yio)] ≠ TVC(Yia) + TVC(Yim). We also note in passing that in the case of two products, the 
measures of global and product-specific scope economies are numerically equivalent. 
III.4. Estimation  Procedure 
The database available for estimation is an unbalanced panel consisting of a cross section 
of eight global advertising and marketing service firms with a maximum of thirteen time series 
observations per firm. For estimation purposes it is convenient to work with (2). To capture the 
diversity among these firms, we allow αi in equation (2) to vary cross-sectionally and thus we 
treat them as fixed effects. The parameters for the scale and scope variables are assumed to be 
equal across the eight firms. Adding a normally distributed disturbance term to (2), our 
estimation equation becomes: 
 ln  AVCit = ln  αi + (β1- l) ln Yit + ½ β2 (ln Yit )
2 + γ Midt + δ Piat + θ Midt Piat + uit (16) 
  i  =  1,…,8;  t = 1989,…2001.   20
The scale, scope, and interaction explanatory variables are likely to be jointly determined, 
along with average variable costs. To accommodate this endogeneity, we utilize two types of 
instruments, each one correlated with the scale, scope, and interaction variables, but not 
correlated with the random disturbance term in the cost equation. The first instrument is common 
to all eight firms, and is defined as the growth rate of real worldwide GDP, lagged one year. A 
second set of instruments varies by firm. The firm-specific variables are the book value of 
shareholder equity, long-term debt, and tax payments as well as the cross-product of shareholder 
equity and taxes. Each of these instruments is expressed in constant U.S. dollars, following the 
convention of using average daily and end-of-the year exchange rates for income statement and 
balance sheet items, respectively. 
Below we report econometric results allowing the scale, scope, and interaction variables 
to be endogenous using instrumental variable methods. In light of the fact that the firms in our 
cross section regularly compete directly with one another, contemporaneous correlations in the 
residuals across firms can be expected. Each firm is therefore treated as a separate equation, in 
the context of a system of equations framework. Parameter estimates are obtained via three stage 
least squares (3SLS) that allows for both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in 
the residuals. Assuming the vector of disturbances across the eight firms is multivariate normal, 
then the parameter estimates for (16) are consistent and asymptotically efficient. See Schmidt 
(1975) and Wooldridge (2002) for further details. The estimation was executed using EViews 4.0 
(2000, Chapt. 19).   21
IV. DATABASE AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
IV.1.  Cross Section of Global Advertising and Marketing Services Firms 
Our cross section of firms consists of the eight largest Global Advertising and Marketing 
Services firms, according to Advertising Age’s (AA) size rankings of the world’s leading “ad 
organizations” for 2001 (Endicott 2002, p. S10). Table 1 lists the firms alphabetically along with 
their worldwide gross incomes for 2001 (as presented in their annual reports) and the length of 
times series for which data were available for use in the analysis. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
The absence of publicly available data precluded extending the sample to include 
additional firms or earlier time periods. For six of the eight firms, thirteen annual observations 
were available. Only four years of data were available for Cordiant which was not formed until 
late 1997, following a de-merger from Saatchi & Saatchi. Reports covering ten years of Havas’ 
history as a public company were obtained.  Thus, the maximum number of observations 
available for estimation purposes was 92. Missing data for certain variables reduced that number 
of observations available for the econometric analyses undertaken to 83. 
Collectively, these eight firms accounted for 93.9 percent of the combined 2001 gross 
income of the world’s 100 largest ad organization identified by AA.
2  Although these eight firms 
dominate the industry’s size structure, they differ considerably in scale: a pair of firms (Cordiant 
and Grey) had gross incomes in 2001 of $0.9 –$1.2 billion, three mid-range firms (Dentsu, 
                                                 
2 It bears noting that the gross incomes and ranking shown in Table 1 differ from those reported by AA for two 
reasons. First, in contrast to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), AA calculates a parent firm’s gross 
income by weighting the gross incomes of subsidiary organizations according to the percentage of equity owned by 
the parent. Under GAAP, the parent company reports the income of a subsidiary only when ownership exceeds 50 
percent of the subsidiary’s equity. Second, AA does not include in gross income revenues derived from several non-
advertising-related services, including public relations and research. See Endicott (2002, p. S-2) for further details.   22
Havas, and Publicis) earned gross incomes of $2.2 –$ 2.7 billion, and three “giants” had gross 
incomes of $6-$7 billion. 
IV.2.  Definitions of Variables 
Table 2 lists the measures used to operationalize the variables in our translog cost model 
(1). Firm annual reports were the primary sources of our data. Worldwide gross income (WGI), 
consisting of commissions and fees paid by clients, has long been recognized as the preferred 
measure of firm size in the advertising and marketing services industry (Paster 1981).
3 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Total variable costs (TVC) are operating expenses and consist primarily of employee 
salaries and benefits, plus office expenses. Depreciation and amortization charges were excluded 
in an effort to reduce inter-firm and or cross-national differences in accounting methods and 
standards. Average variable cost (AVC) was computed as the ratio of total variable costs to gross 
income (TVC/WGI). Note that (1-AVC) is equal to the firm’s gross margin, a measure routinely 
monitored and discussed by firm management and industry analysts. 
Two dimensions of firm scope, corresponding to markets served and line of services 
offered, respectively, were treated separately from one another. Each was measured as a 
dichotomous share of total firm gross income, i.e., share from the U.S. market (USS, (vs. the 
overseas market, (1-USS)) and share from advertising-related services (ADS, vs. other marketing 
                                                 
3 Agency size is sometimes gauged by the magnitude of its clients’ “billings” which include outlays for media space 
and time, charges for production advertising and promotional material, and the like. Estimates of billings are 
notoriously suspect as a measure of agency output or scale inasmuch as to varying degrees, they represent 
“capitalized billings,” calculated by capitalizing an agency’s gross income at some rate, such as the reciprocal of the 
commission rate on media expenditures used to compensate a “full service” agency. Over time, capitalized billings 
have departed from “true” billings as agencies have expanded and unbundled the mix of services they offer and as 
clients have come to rely more on fee-based, and less on commission-based compensation methods.  Cf. Cardona 
(2002a).     23
services, such as promotion, public relations, and research, (1-ADS)). Finally, the cross-product 
term, XAUS = ADS x USS, was created as an interaction term for the two dimensions of scope. 
Systematic measurement error arising from inter-firm and/or cross national differences in 
accounting methods and standards was mitigated by applying consistent definitions of variables 
across firms and time. When comparing the quality of our measures, we judge the advertising 
share, ADS, as the most problematic due to the absence of detail and consistency in reporting the 
decomposition of gross revenue by lines of services. Both inter-firm differences and intra-firm 
variability were apparent. Further, this was the one variable that was most likely to be missing 
from the firm annual reports, particularly in the early phase of our time series. In the interests of 
preserving degrees of freedom, estimates from external sources were used, as noted in Table 2. 
To the extent that measurement errors are firm-specific and fixed over time, we capture them by 
specifying a fixed effect intercept for each firm. 
Finally, we attempt to control for any remaining sources of systematic error by treating 
the intercept term in (2) as a firm fixed effect, thereby allowing the unobserved firm intercept 
term to be arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 10). 
Table 3 presents summary descriptive statistics for the data base. The wide variation 
present in the scale and scope variables is evident from the diverse values of the median, max, 
and min.  Intercorrelations among the variables used in average cost model are shown in the 
lower panel of Table 3. Not unexpectedly, LWGIit and (LWGIit)
2  are virtually perfectly collinear 
(r=0.9989). The market scope variable, USSit, and scope interaction term, XAUSit, are also 
highly intercorrelated (r=0.9137). 
INSERT TABLE 3   24
IV.3. Parameter  Estimates 
Table 4 presents the three stage least square estimates of the twelve parameters  (eight 
coefficients for the firm fixed effects and four coefficients for the scale variable, two scope 
variables and their interaction) obtained using the 83 observations from the unbalanced panel 
available for estimation of the average variable cost model (2). The dependent variable of (2) is 
the natural logarithm of average variable cost (LAVC). Note that since it is expressed relative to 
revenues, this log-transformed variable is less than zero, reflecting the fact that average variable 
cost (AVC) is always less than one. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
Referring to column (1) of Table 4, we see that the estimate of the coefficient for scale 
variable, (β1 -1), has the expected negative sign but is less than its estimated standard error. The 
coefficient for the quadratic scale term (β2/2) is also negative and less than its standard error. The 
negative sign of β2/2 implies that over the considerable range of scale represented in our panel 
data, AVC is everywhere decreasing with increases in scale. A Wald test (EViews 2000, pp. 352-
356) indicated that the null hypothesis that (β2/2)=0 is not be rejected (p=0.7589). However, 
another Wald test indicated that the null hypothesis of constant returns [(βi -1)=0, 
 (β2/2)=0] can 
be decisively rejected (p<0.000l). 
The coefficient estimates for the scope variables (γ and δ, respectively) in the full model 
(Column (1), Table 4) are both positive (and statistically highly significant), indicating that AVC 
increases as the share of gross income contributed by either U.S. operations or advertising-
related services rises. The former effect is almost eighty percent greater than the latter. However, 
what is especially noteworthy is that the coefficient for the interaction of the two scope variables 
(θ) has a negative sign and is more than four times greater than its standard error. If the effects of   25
the two scope variables were independent of one another, we would expect the estimate of θ to 
be zero. That does not appear to hold for these data, and indeed, the interaction effect of the two 
scope variables on total costs appears to be in the opposite direction from that of their individual 
effects. This result is consistent with the view firms may realize cost economies through the joint 
production of both advertising and marketing services. Apparently, the coordination economies 
accompanying the pursuit of the strategy of “one-stop shopping ” are not completely bargained 
away in negotiations with client about compensation and service levels. The coefficients for the 
fixed firm effects are in all cases at least twice their standard errors. 
Given the collinearity of linear (LWGI) and quadratic terms ((LWGI)
2) of the scale 
variable noted earlier, we omitted the latter and re-estimated the model with only the linear term 
included. The results are shown in Column (2) of Table 4. It is immediately apparent that signs 
of all of the coefficients remain unchanged but the magnitude and precision of the estimates has 
increased considerably. The coefficient on LWGI increases markedly in absolute magnitude by a 
factor of more than thirty and is now more than four times its estimated standard error. The 
coefficients for the two scope variables, USS and ADS, each increase in magnitude by about ten 
percent and the precision of these estimates also improves modestly. The coefficient for the 
interaction of the two scope variables remains negative but increases in absolute magnitude by 
about twenty percent. The precision of this estimate also increases modestly. In this simpler 
specification, the estimates of all eight coefficients for the fixed firm effects decrease 
algebraically, but their precision increases dramatically, the estimates now all being at least 
seven times their estimated standard errors. 
With three stage least squares, the usual goodness-of-fit statistics such as adjusted R
2 are 
not well-defined. As an alternative summary indicator of fit, we regressed the fitted values of   26
LACR on their observed values using the parameter estimates reported in Column (2) of Table 4. 
This yields a value of R
2 equal to .657. We conclude that dropping the quadratic scale term from 
(2) results in an adequate specification of the behavior of average variable costs here. Based on 
the parameter estimates from Column (2) of Table 4, we now proceed to investigate scale and 
scope effects. 
V.  ESTIMATES OF SCALE AND SCOPE ECONOMIES 
V.1. Scale  Economies 
Earlier in II.2, we discussed the concept of global or ray returns to scale (RRS) as one 
possible measure of size-related economies. See (3) for the definition. RRS is the ratio of 
average variable cost to marginal cost for the firm’s total gross income, holding fixed its mix of 
outputs which we have operationalized in terms of shares of gross income contributed by 
different markets and lines of services. 
As noted above, in our preferred model specification β2 =0 and hence the expression for 
RRS (5) simplifies to: 
 RRS  =  AVC/MC  =1/  β1. (5a) 
From Table 4, we have (β ˆ
1 -1) = -0.0247 and hence β ˆ
1= 0.9753.  Substituting the 
estimate for β ˆ
1 in (5a), we find RRS = 1.0253. 
Note that RRS is not firm-specific. If we interpret our results as representing a point on 
the long-run average cost curve (Pindyck and Rubinfield 1995) for a typical firm in the 
advertising and marketing services industry, then given that RRS is slightly greater than one, we 
may infer that firms in this industry are operating on a long–run cost curve that is subject to very 
slight economies of scale. It also bears noting that the alternative hypotheses of constant returns 
to scale (β1= 1 and hence RRS=1) was decisively rejected by a Wald test (p<0.000l).   27
We also computed the indices of product-specific scale economies defined in IV.2 as the 
returns to scale associated with two alternative strategies for expanding a firm’s scale: (a) 
extending its line of business from advertising to marketing service, SCL(MS)i and (b) extending 
the markets it serves from the domestic to overseas, SCL(OV)i. Recall each is defined as the 
ratio of average incremental cost to marginal cost for the additional volume gained by extending 
the firm’s service mix or market reach. Firm-specific values of both indices were computed for 
each year using the parameter estimates for our preferred model (with β2 =0) in (8) and (11). The 
results are summarized in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
Across all eight firms and time period for which data were available, diseconomies of 
scale prevailed for extending lines of business from advertising to marketing services. As may be 
seen in column (1) of Table 5, the mean and median for this index were both less than one: 0.282 
and 0.239, respectively, for SCL(MS)i. The range of values for the 83 observations of this index 
was from 0.052 (MIN) to 0.609 (MAX). For each of the eight firms, a separate Wald test was 
performed of the null hypothesis that returns to scale were constant (i.e., AIC = MC and SCL 
=1). For all eight firms, the null hypothesis of constant returns was strongly rejected (p < 
0.0001).   
In the cases of the four firms where the extension of markets served from the U.S. to 
overseas could be validly assessed, diseconomies of scale were also uniformly observed for all 
time periods for which data were available. The mean and median for this scale index 
(SCL(OV), column (2) of Table 5)) were again both less than one (0.492 and 0.501, 
respectively), as were the extreme observed values (MIN = 0.333) and (MAX = 0.654).  Here   28
again, Wald tests indicated that the null hypothesis of constant returns was strongly rejected (p < 
0.0001) for all (four) firms. 
Whereas our estimates indicated global scale economies (RRS = 1.053), product-specific 
diseconomies of scale for both extension of lines of business and expansion of markets served. 
None of the calculated values of either SCLMS or SCLOV summarized in Table 5 exceeded 
unity. To see why global scale economies are consistent with product-specific scale 
diseconomies in this context, consider Eq. (8) for SCL(MS)i which, with β2 =0, may readily be 
shown to simplify to: 
  SCL(MS)  =    [TVC(Yi) – TVC(Yia)]       1    (8a) 
        TVS(Yi)       β1   
The first term on the right-hand side of (8a) is the estimated incremental total cost of 
producing marketing services separately as a proportion of the total costs of jointly producing 
both advertising and marketing services. The second term in (8a) is the index of global scale 
economies (5), ray returns to scale (RRS = 1/ β1). Since our estimate of β1= 0.975, product-
specific diseconomies will obtain unless the incremental total cost of producing the addition to 
the line of business as a proportion of the total cost of producing both lines of services is equal to 
or greater than β1= 0.975. Inasmuch as the maximum value of marketing service’s share of firm 
gross income in our sample was 0.610, it is not surprising that the latter condition does not hold 
here for the addition of market services. Hence we find the latter strategy is accompanied by 
diseconomies of scale (SCL(MS)i < 1). A similar analysis accounts for why extending market 
coverage overseas was also found to involve diseconomies of scale (SCL(OV)i <1).  The 
maximum value of the overseas market’s share of firm total gross income for the four firms 
included in our analysis of SCL(OV) was 0.640.   29
To gain insight into the sources of variation in the magnitude of scale diseconomies 
across firms and times, we regressed the scale indices on the four scale, scope, and scope 
interaction variables affecting the scale indices, as indicated by equations (8) and (11). Given 
that these expressions indicate that the relationship between the product-specific scale indices 
and the measures of scale and scope variables is nonlinear, linear and quadratic terms were 
included in the regressions for the three scale and scope variables. The results are summarized in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table B1 in Appendix B, where the standard partial regression 
coefficients are shown for the aforementioned set of explanatory variables. The estimated 
standard partial regression coefficients measure the change in a scale index as a fraction of its 
standard deviation associated with a change of one standard deviation in the explanatory 
variables (Ezekiel and Fox 1959). The regressions are intended to serve only as a means of 
describing how scale economies covary with measures that reflect the size and composition of a 
firm’s output. Below we highlight the key features of the relationships with firm size and the 
scope variable relevant to each type of product-specific scale economy. Details for the full set of 
covariates are given in columns (1) and (2) of Table B1 in Appendix B. In interpreting these 
results, the reader should be mindful of our basic finding that diseconomies of scale prevailed 
across all firms and over all time periods for both SCL(MS) and SCL(OV). 
Consider first the results pertaining to variation in scale diseconomies relating to firms’ 
broadening their lines of business to include marketing services as well as advertising-related 
ones. The relationship between SCL(MS) and the firm size (WGI = worldwide gross income in 
constant dollars) was found to be non-monotonic (concave from below) with SCL(MS) 
increasing over a small range of  values of firm size: from WGI’ MIN of $484.7 million to a 
gross income level of $767.7 million, which is well below WGI’s median value of $1599.0   30
million. The range from MIN to the inflexion point encompassed almost twenty-eight percent of 
our sample of 83 observations. Beyond the inflexion point, SCL(MS) declined with further 
increases in size for the remaining sixty-two percent of observations.  Not unexpectedly, 
SCL(MS) decreases at a slightly decreasing rate (convex from below) as advertising service’s 
share of firm gross income (ADS) increases over the entire range of observations. 
Turning to the variability in the diseconomies of scale associated with extending 
coverage from the U.S. to overseas markets, we find that SCL(OV) bears no reliable relationship 
with firm size. While the sample of relevant observations (n = 44) here was restricted to only 
four of the eight firms, it nonetheless encompassed a wide range of values of the firm size 
variable (WGI; MIN = $603.1 mill., MAX = 6296.3 mill.). As is to be expected, SCL(OV) 
decreases at a slightly decreasing rate (convex from below) with increases in the U.S. share of 
firm gross income (USS) over the range of available observations. 
V.2. Scope  Economies   
The possible advantages accruing to a firm with a broad product line rather than a narrow 
one, or cost advantages arising from serving the global market rather than just the U.S. market 
may be assessed by estimating returns to scope. As defined in (12) and (14), our index of scope 
economies represents the percentage cost savings realized from the joint production of some mix 
of services (or for a combination of markets) over the costs of producing the services separately 
(or for the markets separately). In the case of two products (or markets), global and product-
specific scope economies are identical. 
Substituting the parameter estimates for our preferred model (with β2 =0) into (13) and 
(15), we calculated for all firms and time periods scope economy indices which estimate the 
percent savings for joint production as compared to stand-alone production of: (a) advertising-  31
related and other marketing services (RSP(LB)i), and (b) U.S. and overseas markets (RSP(GL)i). 
The results are summarized in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5. 
It is immediately apparent from Table 5 that economies of scope were realized by all 
firms in all time periods from joint as opposed to separate production for both diversification 
strategies. The cost savings were small but uniformly positive. The median savings for either 
expanding the line of services offered or extending the scope of markets served was less than two 
per cent, with the variation in savings distributed over a limited range of less than one percent to 
under four percent. For the case of the joint production of advertising and marketing services, the 
estimated cost savings was less than one percent for only about six percent of the sample 
observations. Realization of only minimal cost savings was more frequent for the joint 
production of services for the U.S. and overseas markets; the estimated cost savings was less 
than one percent for nineteen percent of the sample observations. However, the null hypotheses 
that the joint costs equal the sum of the stand-alone costs (RSP(LB)=0 or RSP(GL)=0) was 
strongly rejected (p<0.000l) for all eight firms for both indices of scope economies. 
As with the indices of scale economies, we analyzed variation in the magnitude of scope 
economies by regressing each of the indices of scope economies on the four scale, scope, and 
scope interaction variables. Here we limit the discussion to focus on relations involving the size 
and relevant scope variable. Detailed results for the full set of covariates are presented in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table B1 in Appendix B. 
The estimated relationship between scope economies associated with joint production of 
advertising and marketing services and firm size was found to be J-shaped (convex from below) 
with the minimum level of RSP(LB) occurring when firm size was $813.4 mill. Thus RSP(LB) 
fell as firm size increased for almost a quarter of  the sample observations and  then increased   32
over the subsequent range of observations which accounted for the remaining three-quarters of 
the sample observations. 
The estimated relationship between SCL(LB) and the share of firm revenue arising from 
advertising services (ADS) was concave (from below). However, over the range of observations 
of RSP(LB) contained in the sample, RSP(LB) decreased monotonically as advertising share 
increased. That relationship is consistent with the expectation that as firms add marketing 
services to their prior line of advertising services, savings from the joint production of both 
increase with increases in  the share of firm revenue realized from marketing services since the 
latter share equals (1-ADS). 
In the case of the other dimension of scope (RSP(GL),  the form of the relationship 
between firm size and savings from producing for both the U.S. and overseas markets jointly 
rather than separately was found to be J-shaped (convex from below), similar to the manner in 
which RSP(LB) and firm size were found to be related. RSP(GL) declined as size increased 
when gross income was $1,462.4 million or less (which accounted for about forty-two percent of 
the observations) and then increased as firm size increased beyond that level for the remaining 
fifty-eight percent of the sample observations.  For at least a majority of our sample of 
observations, both RSP(LB) and RSP(GL) increased as firm size increased. Thus, in contrast to 
Silk and Berndt’s (1995) results for individual advertising agencies, we find no evidence of any 
tendency for large holding companies to over diversify. To the contrary, at low levels of firm 
size, scope economies appear to decrease with increases in firm size and hence small firms may 
be under diversified in the sense that greater scope economies could be realized were they able to 
achieve gross incomes above the inflexion point in J-shaped relationship between size and scope 
economies.   33
Contrary to expectations, the parameter estimates for the relevant standardized partial 
regression coefficients indicated that RSP(GL) increased (rather than decreased) monotonically 
as share of firm revenue from U.S. operations (USS) increased (convex from below). This 
counterintuitive result may be accounted for by the presence of an influential cluster of 
observations for firms based outside the U.S. with extremely small shares of their gross income 
coming from U.S. operations, especially in the early years of the time series. When that set of 
observations was removed, the expected negative relationship between RSP(GL) and USS 
emerged. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
VI.1.  Scale and Scope Economies 
Our results suggest that the industry’s long-run cost function is subject to very slight 
economies of scale. We also find that modest diseconomies of scale accompanied  the 
broadening of lines of business (from advertising to marketing services) or market coverage 
(from the U.S. to overseas).  Product-specific scale diseconomies were shown to be consistent 
with overall or global scale economies in this context, given the limited level of global scale 
economies available and the composition of firm income with respect to lines of business and 
markets served.  Taken together, these findings do not point to any substantial level of potential 
scale economies that remains to be exploited by the largest firms in this industry. Such findings 
are to be expected in a highly competitive industry with relatively low fixed costs. 
However, two cautions should be noted. First, recall that the parameter estimate for the 
quadratic term in our cost model turned out to be non-significant. Hence, we have been unable to 
learn much about the shape of the long-run cost curve or how firms might be arrayed along it.  
Second, we have not attempted to model the adjustment processes surrounding mergers and   34
acquisitions and that omission may have clouded our results.  In particular, the adjustment costs 
associated with digesting mergers and acquisitions could manifest themselves in our empirical 
analyses as diseconomies of scale. See Johnson and Simon (1970) for a provocative but now 
dated study of advertising agency mergers and acquisitions. 
Our estimates of scope economies indicate that a small cost advantage, typically only one 
to two percent, is realized through the joint rather than separate production of advertising and 
marketing services and for the domestic and overseas markets. Obviously this is a crude 
partitioning of the global market and a more fine-grained decomposition would be preferable, 
especially one that separated the overseas market into European and Asian components. A more 
detailed disaggregation of firm revenue shares with respect to both lines of business and markets 
served would allow the scope and interaction variables to be defined and measured in terms of 
specific combinations of services and markets. These issues are deserving of further research. 
We also note the possible threats to the validity of statistical conclusions posed by 
currencies fluctuations, cross-national differences in accounting standards, and by intra-firm and 
inter-firm differences in accounting methods. The adequacy of our estimates of firm fixed effects 
as controls for those factors remains to be assessed. 
VI.2.  The Advantage of the Holding Company Form of Organization 
In earlier studies we investigated the role of scale and scope economies in the domestic 
operations of U.S. agencies (Schamalensee, Silk, and Bojanek 1983 and Silk and Berndt 1993, 
1995). Using a proxy for average cost (employees per dollar of gross income) in a cross sectional 
analysis of 400 agencies, Silk and Berndt (1993) found that both scale and particularly scope 
economies (measured by shares of output in different advertising media) were highly significant 
in the operations of U.S. agencies. They estimated the minimum efficient size of a domestic   35
agency to be $3-4 million of gross income in 1987 dollars ($6-8 million in 2001 dollars). Of the 
approximately 10,000 firms comprising the industry in 1987, 200- 250 had domestic gross 
incomes at that level or larger and therefore had output levels and media-mixes sufficient to take 
full advantage of all the size-related efficiencies seemingly available at that time. 
The 2001 worldwide gross income of the smallest of the eight holding companies 
included in this study (Cordiant) was more than a hundred times greater than the aforementioned 
estimate of minimum efficient size of a domestic agency; the largest in our present study 
(Omnicom) was almost eight hundred times greater.  The overwhelming difference in scale 
raises the question: what, exactly, are the advantages of the holding company structure not 
available in a single agency structure? 
Fine et al. (2003, p. 123) suggests that the answer lies in cost economies and the ability to 
cope with the constraints imposed by the account conflicts. Our results are consistent with such 
advantages in the sense that we find that holding companies appear to be operating in the vicinity 
of a point on the long-run cost curve subject to scale economies, albeit quite modest ones, and 
are generally diversified to an extent that permits realization of positive scope economies, again 
of quite limited magnitude. Furthermore, our analyses of how variability in scope economies is 
related to firm size indicated that holding companies are not subject to the excessive 
diversification which Berndt and Silk (1995) found in their study of individual advertising 
agencies and which they attributed to the constraints on growth imposed by conflict policy and 
the bundling of services. Thus, the holding company appears to be a form of organization which   
circumvents the institutional constraints which restricted the growth and diversification 
opportunities of the traditional full service advertising agency.   36
Holding companies are publicly-owned enterprises and no explicit attention has been 
given to that condition in the present study. Research underway by von Nordenflycht (2003) 
emphasizes the advantages of holding companies with respect to access to capital markets and 
the ability to exploit size as a proxy for capabilities. Interestingly, he finds no relationship 
between public vs. private agency ownership and winning awards for creativity. 
VI.3.  Organization of the Advertising and Marketing Services Industry 
Historically, the U.S. advertising agency business has been characterized as a classic 
example of an industry with minimal barriers to entry, low fixed costs and geographically 
dispersed demand—i.e., roughly forty to forty-five per cent of total U.S. advertising expenditures 
are accounted for by local, as opposed to national advertisers. Silk and Berndt (1995) argued that 
the structure of demand and costs in the U.S. advertising agency business conforms to the 
conditions Macdonald and Slivinski (1989) showed were required for an industry to sustain an 
equilibrium with diversified firms. A highly diverse and unconcentrated size structure has long 
persisted in the U.S. advertising agency industry and over time, it has become more 
geographically dispersed (King, Silk, and Kettelhohn 2003). That size structure has enabled 
holding companies to cherrypick from a large and varied pool of mid-sized and small U.S.-based 
agencies (and human capital) in making hundreds of acquisitions over the past several decades. 
More than a decade and a half ago, Sheth (1986) predicted that three global firms would 
eventually dominate the industry.
4 Silk and King (2003) found that the concentration level in the 
U.S. advertising agency business, as traditionally defined, rose during the 1990’s—although not 
to the extent that has sometimes been suggested. Their estimates indicate that the major 
advertising agency brands controlled by the eight largest holding companies represented about a 
                                                 
4 Also see Sheth and Sisodia (2002).   37
quarter of the total gross income earned from traditional advertising-related services in 2001 by 
all U.S. agencies. How the industry structure in other countries that represent smaller regional 
and local markets has been affected by globalization and diversification awaits further study. The 
shifts in client demand toward more global and diversified advertising and marketing services 
has, of course, also raised barriers to entry and fixed costs for suppliers of those services. The 
nature of the industry equilibrium that can be sustained under these altered conditions is also an 
important topic for further research. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper reported an econometric analysis of cost economies experienced by holding 
companies operating in the global advertising and marketing services business. Treating holding 
companies as multi-product firms, we estimated a translog model of costs. A firm’s total variable 
costs are affected by its scale, scope of its lines of business and market coverage, and the 
interaction of the latter two dimensions of scope.  Our results indicate that the long-run cost 
function for firms in the global advertising and marketing services business is subject to very 
slight scale economies. Growth in volume obtained through either extending the lines of business 
to include marketing services in addition to advertising services or expanding market coverage 
overseas from the U.S. were subject to modest levels of product-specific diseconomies of scale. 
These findings do not point to any substantial level of potential scale economies that remains to 
be exploited by the largest firms in this industry. Such findings are to be expected in a highly 
competitive industry with relatively low fixed costs. 
Small scope economies amounting to a few percentage points of cost savings accompany 
diversification through both extending lines of business and expanding market coverage. While 
small in percentage terms, in an industry where firms strive to achieve operating margins of   38
fifteen percent and where income and costs are measured in billions, these economies 
(diseconomies) clearly matter. The institutional constraints, especially adherence to the industry 
norm of an agency not serving competing accounts, that limited the potential of traditional full 
service advertising agencies for growth and diversification appear to have been obviated by the 
holding company form of organization.   39
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Table 1 
CROSS SECTION OF FIRMS 
 
Firm     Head- 
quarters 
Time Series  2001 World  
Gross Income 





London  1998-2001 4    $    871.26  
        
Dentsu Tokyo  1989-2001 13    2,417.7
b 
        
Grey Global Group 
Inc. 
New York  1989-2001 13    1,217.0 




1992-2001 10   2,241.4 
        
Interpublic Group  New York  1989-2001 13    6,726.8 




New York  1989-2001 13    6,889.4 
        
Publicis Groupe SA  Paris  1989-2001 13    2,718.9 
        
WPP Group plc  London  1989-2001 13    5,791.7 
        
TOTAL         $  28,874.1 
 
 
a Cordiant was taken over by WPP on August 1, 2003. 
 
b For fiscal year ending 3/31/02. 
 
c Data for 1992-1994 are for Euro RSCG which then became Havas Advertising in 1995. 
 
Source: Annual Reports. For non-U.S. firms, conversions to $U.S. of gross income reported in 
other currencies were made at the daily average exchange rates for 2001.  
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Table 2 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES* 
 
Abbreviation                                     Definition 
WGIit  World-wide gross income from commission and fees for agency i in  
year t in millions of constant $ U.S.  i = 1,…,8; t = 1989,…,2001. 
  
LWGIit  Natural logarithm of WGIit. 
  
TVCit  Total variable operating costs in millions of constant $ U.S. 
  
AVCit  Average variable operating costs, calculated as TVCit /WGIit. 
  
LAVCit  Natural logarithm of AVCit. 
  
ADSit  Share of WGIit accounted for advertising-related services. The share 
contributed by other marketing services is: (1-ADSit). 
  
USSit  Share of WGIit accounted for output sold in the U.S. market. The share 
for the overseas market is (1-USSit). 
  
XAUSit  Interaction term, XAUSit = ADSit x USSit. 
 
 
* Annual reports for each of the firms were sources for the income and cost data used to 
compute the set of variables listed above. For non-U.S. firms, variables reported in foreign 
currencies were converted to U.S. dollars following the accounting convention of making the 
conversion of income and costs at the average daily exchange rate for each year. Quantities of 
current U.S. dollars were transformed into constant U.S. dollars using the GDP implicit price 
deflator. In cases where data for ADS and USS were not included in the annual reports, estimates 
found in the reports of financial analysts or in the annual issues of Advertising Age’s “Agency 
Report,” were used, where such data were available.   
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Table 3 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS FOR REVENUE AND COST VARIABLES 
(n=83) 
 Vari-      
  Able 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Max  Min 
AVCit    0.8491  0.0384 0.8478 0.9271 0.7489 
WGIit    1932.928  1381.857 1598.954 6296.295 484.664 
ADSit   0.7200  0.1340  0.7200 0.9471 0.3900 
USSit    0.3251  0.1854 0.3985 0.6383 0.0102 
XAUSit   0.2179  0.1271 0.2306 0.4482 0.0073 
          
LAVCit    -0.1664  0.0468 -0.1651 -0.0757 -0.2892 





(n = 83) 
 LAVCit LWGIit  (LWGIit)
2 USSit  ADSit  XAUSit 
LAVCit  1.0000       
LWGIit  -0.2439  1.0000      
(LWGIit)
2  -0.2437 0.9989 1.0000         
USSit  0.4289 0.3948 0.4002 1.0000     
ADSit  -0.0840 -0.5275 -0.5390 -0.4024. 1.0000   
XAUSit  0.4623 0.1312 0.1327 0.9137  -0.0145 1.0000 
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Table 4 
THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARE PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR ALTERNATIVE 
SPECIFICATIONS OF LOG AVERAGE COST MODEL 
(n = 83) 
    Dependent Variable: LAVCit 
 Vaiable  Parameter  Parameter Estimate 
    (Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Std Error)
    (1)  (2) 
      
LWGIit  (βi -1) -0.008517    -0.024713 
   (0.247)  (4.698) 
      
(LWGIit)
2  β2/2
  -0.000705  
   (0.307)   
      
USSit  γ  0.579196 0.662785 
   (5.710)  (6.406) 
      
ADSit  δ 0.324241  0.363235 
   (6.196)  (6.715) 
      
XAUSi  θ  -0.636157 -0.763902 
   (4.501)  (5.297) 
      
Firm-Specific 
Intercept 
ln αi      
i = 1    -0.327982  -0.278684 
   (2.394)  (7.742) 
i = 2    -0.382490  -0.332183 
   (2.677)  (8.538) 
i = 3    -0.305785  -0.250309 
   (2.220)  (7.364) 
i = 4    -0.328578  -0.276019 
   (2.376)  (8.793) 
i = 5    -0.387107  -0.327275 
   (2.807)  (9.434) 
i = 6    -0.358471  -0.302363 
   (2.574)  (9.124) 
i = 7    -0.355101  -0.305281 
   (2.574)  (9.512) 
i = 8    -0.292106  -0.235310 
   (2.095)  (7.146) 
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Table 5 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ESTIMATES OF SCALE AND SCOPE ECONOMIES 
 
         Returns to Scale: AIC/MC  
 
 
Scope Economies:  % Cost 
Savings from Joint Production 
over Stand-Alone Production for: 
  (1) 
Extending Lines 
of Business from 






from U.S. to 
Overseas 













Mean 0.282  0.492  1.709  1.733 
        
Std. Dev.  0.146  0.073  0.521  0.920 
        
Median 0.239 0.501 1.713  1.777 
        
Max 0.609  0.654  3.755  3.688 
        
Min 0.052  0.333  0.518  0.152 





















            8 
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF INDICES OF SCALE AND SCOPE EFFECTS 
A.1.  Product-Specific Scale Economies 
A.1.a.  Advertising and Marketing Services as Separate Products 
Given that a firm is producing advertising-related services, we wish to measure the scale 
economies (or diseconomies) associated with adding other marketing services to its service mix. 
Following Bailey and Friedlander (1982, p.1030), we may define the returns to scale for this case 
as: 
 SCL(MS)i = AICim / MCim (A1) 
where AICim is the average incremental cost of producing the quantity Yim of marketing services 
in addition to its output of advertising-related services, Yia. 
 AICim = [TVC(Yi) – TVC(Yia)]/Yim, (A2) 
where: 
 Y im = (1-Pia)Yi (A3) 
The numerator of the right hand side of (A2) is the difference between the total costs of 
producing both products jointly, TVC(Yi), and the total cost of producing the advertising 
services separately, TVC(Yi). For our translog cost model (1), TVC(Yi) is: 
 TVC(Yi) = exp(ln  αi + β1 ln Yi + ½  β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia + θ MidPia) (A4) 
Now if advertising services were produced separately, the volume of such services would 
remain unchanged (i.e., Yia=Pia Yi), but would now account for all of the output (i.e., Pa=1). We 
assume that the composition of the advertising services volume in terms of mix of production for 
the U.S. and overseas markets remains the same as for the firm as a whole, as given by the share, 
Mid and (1-Mid), respectively. Substituting in (A4), we obtain: 
 TVC(Yia) = exp(ln  αi + β1 ln PiaYi + ½ β2 (ln PiaYi )
2 + (γ + θ) Mid + δ) (A5) 
The denominator in (A1) is the marginal cost defined as: 
 MCim = ∂TVC(Yi) / ∂Yim (A6) 
Using (A4) and taking the partial derivative of TVC(Yi) with respect to Yim we obtain: 
 MCim = [{β1 + β2 ln Yi}exp{ln αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia                                   
+ θ Mid Pia}] / (1-P ia )Yi (A7)   48
Substituting (A3), (A4), (A5) in (A2) for Yim, TVC(Yi), and TVC(Yia), respectively, and 
dividing by (A7) in (A1), we get: 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2  γ Mid + δ Pia + θ Mid Pia} 
     -  exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (Pia Yi)  + ½ β2 (ln Pia Yi )
2  + (γ  + θ)Mid + δ}] 
 SCL(MS)i = ______________________________________________________  (A8) 
     [ { β1 + β2 ln Yi}exp{ln αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia                                           
+ θ Mid Pia}]                                               
A.1.b.  Markets Served as Separate Products 
The product-specific index of scale economies, SCLio associated with extending 
operations from the U.S. market (d) to the overseas market (o) is defined as SCLio, the ratio of 
average incremental cost, AICio, to the marginal cost, MCio of producing the volume sold in the 
overseas market (o) in addition to that sold in the U.S. market (d): 
 SCL(OV)i = AICio / MCio, (A9) 
AICio is defined as the incremental cost of adding volume sold in the overseas market to 
the costs incurred by a firm previously producing only for the U.S. market: 
 AICio = [TVC(Yi) – TVC(Yid)]/Yio, (A10) 
where: 
 Y io = (1-Mid)Yi (A11) 
TVC(Yi) is the total variable cost of producing the volume sold in both the domestic and 
overseas markets and is given by (A4).   
TVC(Yid) is the total variable cost of producing only the volume sold in U.S. market   
(Yid = Mid Yi ) and Yio= (1- Mid )Yi is output sold overseas.  MCio is marginal cost and defined as 
∂TVC(Yi) / ∂Yio . If output for the overseas market were produced separately, the quantity 
required for that segment would remain unchanged (i.e., Yia=Pia Yi), but would now account for 
all of the output (i.e., Pa=1). We assume that the composition of the advertising services volume 
in terms of mix of production of advertising and marketing services remains the same as before 
for the firm as a whole, as given by the share, Mid and (1-Mid), respectively. Substituting in (A4), 
we obtain: 
 TVC(Yid) = exp{  ln  αi + β1 ln (Mid Yi)  + ½ β2 (ln Mid Yi )
2  + (δ + θ)Pia + γ} (A12)   49
The denominator in (A1) is the marginal cost defined as: 
 MCio = ∂TVC(Yi) / ∂Yio (A13) 
Using (A4) and taking the partial derivative of TVC(Yi) with respect to Yio we obtain: 
 MCio = [{β1 + β2 ln Yi}exp{ln αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia                                      
+ θ Mid Pia}] / (1-Mid)Yi (A14) 
Substituting (A11), (A4), (A12) in (A10) for Yio, TVC(Yi) , and TVC(Yio), respectively, and 
dividing by (A14) in (A9), we get: 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2  γ Mdi + δ Pia + θ Mid Pia} 
     -  exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (Mid Yi)  + ½ β2 (ln Mid Yi )
2 + (δ + θ)Pia + γ}] 
 SCL(OV)i = ______________________________________________________  (A15) 
     [ { β1 + β2 ln Yi}exp{ln αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ P                                               
+ θ Mid Pia }] 
A.2.  Global Scope Economies 
A.2.a.  Advertising and Marketing Services as Separate Products 
We wish to measure the cost savings (or dissavings) that may arise when the two lines of 
business (i.e., advertising versus marketing services) that constitute the firm’s service mix are 
produced jointly in the same organization rather than separately in separate organizations, each 
producing a different lines of business.  For this case, returns to scope (RSPLBi) or the 
percentage cost savings realized from joint versus individual production is: 
 RSP(LB)i = [TVC(Yia) + TVC(Yim) – TVC(Yi)]/  TVC(Yi) (A16) 
where TVC(Yia)  and TVC(Yim) are the costs of producing advertising (denoted by the subscript 
a) and marketing services separately(m), respectively, and TVC(Yi) is the cost of producing 
those services jointly. 
If advertising services were produced separately, then the volume of such services would 
remain unchanged (i.e., Yia = PiaYi) but that volume would account for all of the output of the 
specialized organization (i.e, Pia = 1). We assume that the volume of both the specialized 
organizations with respect to the shares of output produced for the U.S. and overseas markets 
remain the same as for the firm under joint production, i.e., Mid , and (1-Mid), respectively.   50
Applying these assumptions to our translog cost model (1), we find the total variable cost 
of producing advertising services separately to be: 
 TVC(Yia) = exp{ln  αi + β1 ln Pia Yi + ½ β2 (ln Pia Yi )
2 +
 (γ + θ) Mid + δ} (A17) 
Next we derive the total variable cost of producing marketing services separately, 
TVC(Yim).  The volume of that output is Yim = (1-Mia), but Pia = 0, since only marketing services 
are produced. Inserting these assumptions into the translog cost model (1), we find: 
 TVC(Yim) = exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (1- Pia )Yi + ½ β2 (ln (1-Pia )Yi )
2 + γ Mid} (A18) 
As before, the total variable cost of joint production, TVC(YI), is given by (A4). 
Substituting (A17), (A18), and (A4) in (A16) for TVC(Yia), TVC(Yim), and TVC(Yi), 
respectively, we get: 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 ln Pai Yi + ½ β2 (ln Pia Yi )
2 + (γ + θ) Mid + δ}]                                               
     +  [exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (1- Pia )Yi + ½ β2 (ln (1-Pia )Yi )
2 + γ Mid} ] 
 RSP(LB)i  =  ________________________________________________             - l  (A19) 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia + θ Mii Pia}] 
A.2.b.  Markets Served as Separate Products 
For the alternative split based on market served, returns to scope, RSPMSi, the 
percentage cost savings gained from joint versus separate production is: 
 RSP(MS)i = [TVC(Yid) + TVC(Yio) – TVC(Yi)]/  TVC(Yi)] (A20) 
Following similar reasoning to that discussed above with reference to the costs of split 
production of advertising and marketing services, we obtain the following expressions for the 
total variable costs of separating production for the U.S. and overseas markets, TVC(Yid) and 
TVC(Yio), respectively: 
 TVC(Yid) = exp{ln  αi + β1 ln Mid Yi + ½ β2 (ln Mid Yi )
2 + γ + (δ + θ) Pia} (A21) 
 TVC(Yio) = exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (1- Mid )Yi + ½ β2 (ln (1-Mid )Yi )
2 + δ Pia} (A22)   51
Substituting (A21), (A22), and (A4) for TVC(Yid),  TVC(Yio), and TVC(Yi), 
respectively, in (A20), we obtain: 
     [exp{lnαi + β1 ln Mid Yi + ½ β2 (ln Mid Yi )
2 + γ + (δ + θ) Pia}]          
     +  [exp{ln  αi + β1 ln (1- Mid )Yi + ½ β2 (ln (1-Mid )Yi )
2 + δ Pia}] 
 RSP(GL)i  =  ________________________________________________        - l  (A23) 
     [exp{ln  αi + β1 lnYi + ½ β2 (ln Yi )
2 + γ Mid + δ Pia + θ Mid Pia}] 
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APPENDIX B: STANDARDIZED REGRESSIONS RELATING SCALE AND SCOPE 
INDICES TO FIRM VARIABLES 
Each of the four product-specific indices of scale and scope economies summarized in 
Table 5 were separately regressed on the four size, share, and share interaction variables 
affecting the indices, as given by equations (8), (11), (13), and (15) which define the indices. 
Inasmuch as those expressions suggest that the relationship are nonlinear, we both linear and 
quadratic terms were included in the regressions for the three size and share variables. To 
facilitate comparisons across the regressions, all dependent and explanatory variables were 
scaled in units of the sample values of their standard deviations.  Table B1 below presents the set 
of estimated standard partial regression coefficients for each regression. Standard partial 
regression coefficients measure the change in a scale index, expressed as a proportion of the 
sample value of its standard deviation, associated with a change of one standard deviation in an 
explanatory variable (Ezekiel and Fox 1959. Given the panel structure of our data, parameter 
estimates were obtained by treating each of the four equations as a set of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR), one per firm. The intercept term was allowed to vary across firms (and 
treated as fixed effects) while the coefficients for the explanatory variables were assumed to be 
equal across firms. In the interests of conserving space, estimates of the intercept terms are not 
shown. 
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Table B1 
STANDARDIZED REGRESSIONS FOR SCALE AND SCOPE INDICES 
 
  Dependent Variable 
         Returns to Scale: AIC/MC  
 
 
Scope Economies:  % Cost 
Savings from Joint Production 




of Business from 






from U.S. to 
Overseas 















Standardized Regression Coefficients 
(Ratio of Coefficient to Standard Error) 
LWGIit 0.139  -0.033  -1.442  -0.791 
 (9.847)  (1.486)  (2.266)  (2.810) 
        
  (LWGIit)
2 -0.155  0.038  1.594  0.804 
 (10.273)  (1.550)  (2.386)  (2.604) 
        
ADSit  -0.857 0.503  0.872  -1.754 
 (116.409)  (34.989)  (3.054)  (12.969) 
        
  (ADSit)
2 0.091  -0.125  -2.184  1.268 
 (15.923)  (12.026)  (8.812)  (10.814) 
        
USSit  0.605 -0.978  -4.005  1.323 
 (45.922)  (76.485)  (8.697)  (5.182) 
        
  (USSit)
2 -0.019  0.120  1.086  0.994 
 (5.177)  (12.449)  (9.799)  (15.332) 
        
XAUSit  -0.355 0.037  2.165  0.268 
 (33.118)  (4.435)  (5.853)  (1.310) 
        
No. of Observ.  83  44  83  83 
        
No. of Firms  8  4  8  8 
        
Adjusted R
2  0.999 0.999  0.712  0.890 
        
Std. Error Of 
Estimate 
0.011 0.005  0.536  0.331 
 